

SOME  
THOUGHTS  
ON

*Self-Love, Innate-Ideas, Free-Will,  
Taste, Sentiment, Liberty, and  
Necessity, &c.*

OCCASIONED

By reading Mr. HUME's Works,  
And the Short Treatise, written in French by  
Lord Bolingbroke, on COMPASSION.

Together with a few

REMARKS

ON THE

GENUINE SEQUEL;

AND ON

Mr. Knowles's ANSWER to the *Essay on Spirit*.

In a LETTER to a Friend.

*By Robert Caspion.*

By the Author of *The Essay on Spirit*.

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THE SECOND EDITION.

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# THOUGHTS

ON

THE STATE OF THE  
NATION  
IN 1790

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SOME  
THOUGHTS  
ON  
SELF-LOVE, &c.

WHEN I had last the Honour of conversing with you about the *Essay on Spirit*, you was pleased to object to that Passage wherein I say, “ And hence also Self-Love may be looked upon in Nature as the Principle of all voluntary action, and the Foundation of all Morality [a].” And, upon our further Conversation, you was pleased to say, that you could wish I had explained myself more fully on that Subject. I own, in that Treatise, I endeavoured to be *short*, and by that Means, possibly, as *Horace* observes, may have been *obscure*; but, if you had followed the Track of Reasoning laid down in a few of the preceding Paragraphs, there were sufficient Traces left to have conducted you to this conclusion :

[a] *Essay on Spirit*, Sect. xii.

B

For,

For, I had said, when speaking of intelligent Spirits, that, “ If the Almighty is pleased to  
 “ add a Liberty of Will to this active Intel-  
 “ lect, and create Spirits endowed with a  
 “ Power of voluntary Motion, then it seems  
 “ necessary that Almighty God should confer  
 “ also upon such intelligent Spirits, such Fa-  
 “ culties and Powers as would be capable of  
 “ perceiving Pleasure or Pain: Since nothing  
 “ else but a Sense of one or other of these  
 “ seems capable of determining the Will to  
 “ act. For, if the Sensation of Pleasure or  
 “ Pain, be removed from the Will, there can  
 “ be no Reason or cause for it to prefer one  
 “ Motion to another, and of Consequence no  
 “ Direction or Determination.”

And now if this be true, and that the seeking of Pleasure and avoiding of Pain is the Cause and Origin of all voluntary Motion, must not Self-Love, which consists in the Desire of Pleasure and the Dread of Pain, be the Foundation of all our Obligations to the Practice of Morality? For, as Morality, which is so called because it is conversant *circa* *Mores Hominum*, that is, about the *Manners* or *Morals* of Men, consists in a Conformity of our Thoughts and Actions to those Obligations, which result from the Nature of our own Existence, and the Relations in Life  
 which



which we bear to God, and the rest of our Fellow-Creatures; in order to engage or oblige us to this Conformity, some Pleasure must be proposed to the Mind for a Reward, or some Pain for a Punishment, in case we are refractory. And, in order to render this Conformity the Object of Rewards and Punishments, it is necessary that the will should be free. And therefore, if nothing but Self-Love is capable of exciting the Will to act either one Way or the other, must not the aforementioned Proposition be undeniably true?

But, as I find Mr. *Hume* is of the same Opinion with you, and thinks that Proposition, of Self-Love being the Foundation of all Morality, is not tenable, I shall endeavour to explain myself further upon this Head.

Mr. *Hume* seems to be mistaken in several Points: First, in making Virtue to consist in that which is thought praise-worthy. And accordingly he “ defines Virtue to be, what-  
“ ever mental Action, or Quality, gives to a  
“ Spectator the pleasing Sentiment of Appro-  
“ bation; and Vice the contrary [b]”. Now if this be true, the Action of a Savage, torturing his Captive in cool Blood, amidst the

[b] Vol. iii. p. 203.

Acclamations of his barbarous Companions, is *Virtue*; and the Attendants on *Broughton's* Amphitheatre, as well as the Disciples of the noble Science of *Bruising*, would all be Men of *Virtue*. Whereas this is no more the Definition of *Virtue*, than that of a two-legged unfeathered Animal is the Definition of a Man. For though true it is, that all virtuous Actions merit, and generally do meet with, Approbation; yet it is not equally true that every Thing which meets with Approbation is *Virtue*.

He is again mistaken in his Notions about Liberty; for says he, "Liberty when opposed to Necessity, not to Constraint, is the same Thing with Chance; which is universally allowed to have no Existence [c]." Which, if it be true, then indeed, according to the Doctrine of some of our modern *French* Philosophers, *Man is a Machine*.

He is again wrong in supposing Reason to precede Sentiment. For, says he, "I suspect that Reason and Sentiment concur in almost all moral Determinations. But in order to pave the Way for such Sentiment, and give Men a proper Discernment of its Object, it is often necessary, we find, that much Reasoning should precede [d]." In which Opi-

[c] Vol. iii. p. 152.

[d] Vol. iii. p. 6.

nion he seems to be supported by Lord *Bol-  
linbroke*, who in a small Pamphlet written  
in *Paris*, and in the *French* Tongue, upon  
“ *that Proposition which affirms Compassion*  
“ *for other Men to be a Principle born with*  
“ *all Men, or an Instinct common to the whole*  
“ *Species of Animals,*” endeavours to shew  
the Falsity of this Proposition ; and in order  
to shew this Affection not to be innate, re-  
solves it into “ the Effect of Reason and Edu-  
“ cation founded on the only innate Direction  
“ or Impression, that, he says, he is acquaint-  
“ ed with, which causeth us to pursue Plea-  
“ sure and fly from Pain, the main Spring and  
“ first Mover of all human Actions ;” which  
he also styleth *Self-Love* : but then he says  
further, “ that this is a blind Guide, and ex-  
“ poseth us to numberless untoward Actions.  
“ And for this Reason we are never left to the  
“ Guidance of this Principle till the Principle  
“ itself be guided by Reason.”

In a Part of which Reasoning I entirely  
agree with him, *viz.* that the Love of Plea-  
sure and Dread of Pain is the main Spring and  
first Mover of all human Actions. But I can-  
not agree with him, either in affirming this to  
be the only innate Direction, Impression, or  
Principle ; or that we are never left to the  
Guidance

Guidance of this Principle, till the Principle itself be guided by Reason.

Had I seen either of these aforementioned Treatises before I published the *Essay on Spirit*, it is probable I should have been more copious and explicit on this Subject; but as I had not then seen either of them, I shall now endeavour to make up the Deficiency.

And in order thereto, I must first shew the Distinction there is between our Ideas and the Objects of our Ideas; because they are often confounded together, and in particular by Mr. *Hume*, who in his Essay on innate Ideas finds Fault with Mr. *Locke* for asserting that there are no innate Ideas; and says, "I desire to know what can be meant by asserting, that Self-Love, or Resentment of Injuries, or the Passion betwixt the Sexes is not innate?" Where it is plain that Mr. *Hume* mistakes the Passion for the Idea, that is, the Objects of our Ideas for our Ideas. It was therefore with a View to prevent all this kind of false Reasoning, which I had before observed in some other Writers, that I set out in the *Essay on Spirit* in defining what I meant by *Ideas*, and how they are to be distinguished from *Modes* and *Substances*. And therefore I said, that "every Existence or Being I call a *Substance*;" "the Manner in which this *Substance* makes

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“ an Impression on our Minds, I call a *Mode* ;  
 “ and the Effect or Impression which is there-  
 “ by made upon the Mind, I call an *Idea*.”  
 And hence it is manifest in the first Place, that  
 there can be no such Thing as an innate *Idea*,  
 because there can be no *Idea* in the Mind  
 till after some *Substance* by the Means of some  
*Mode* hath made an Impression upon it.

And because some late Writers [*e*] had asserted that we have no *Ideas* but of sensible Objects, which alone are capable of making any Impression on our Minds ; I therefore also shewed that the Methods, by which the Mind is furnished with Ideas, are two, *viz.* *Sensation* and *Reflexion* ; which are by some Persons called our external and our internal Senses. And as with regard to our outward or external Senses, it is plain, that no Man can have an Idea of seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, &c. till after he has seen, felt, heard, or tasted, &c. which are properly called the Ideas of *Sensation* ; so neither can he have any Ideas of the internal Senses, till after they have exerted their Power of Operation. As for Example, no Man can have an Idea of thinking,

[*e*] Brown on the Procedure, Extent, and Limits of human Understanding. And from him the Authors of the Natural State of Man ; and of Deism revealed.

willing,

willing, doubting &c. till after the Intellect has thought, willed, or doubted, &c. which are properly called Ideas of *Reflexion*, because they are produced by the reflex Act of the Mind in considering its own Operations. And hence it appears, that the Mind can have no innate Ideas at all ; and of Consequence none either of Pleasure or of Pain, till after it hath felt and experienced them.

What is it then, you will say, that makes him love the one, and dread the other? It is an innate Affection implanted in us by our Creator, who has framed the Mind of Man in such a Manner as to take a Pleasure in certain Objects, and to receive Pain from others ; which operateth in us by a kind of *Instinct*. So that Almighty God hath not only implanted in us the Love of Pleasure, and the Dread of Pain in general, as Lord *Bolingbroke* asserts, but has also by Nature annexed the Sensation of Pleasure to certain Objects, and the Sensation of Pain to others, whenever those Objects present themselves to the Mind. Which is the Link in his Chain of Argumentation that Lord *Bolingbroke* has missed, and for Want of which he hath failed in the true Method of Reasoning upon this Subject.

For, can any one otherwise tell why one Taste should be agreeable to the Palate of a Child,

Child, and another not? Why Men should prefer one Smell, or one Sound to another? Why Beauty should strike the Eye, and Harmony the Ear, with such agreeable Sensations? but because these Passions or Affections are innate, though the Ideas are not.

It is, indeed, for wise Purposes that Almighty God has annexed Pleasure to some Sensations, and Pain to others. But we feel the Pleasure before we are sensible of the Utility. *Curiosity* is as natural a Passion to the Mind, as either Thirst, or Hunger, is to the Body; and the Pleasure which we all feel in gratifying this Passion, and which excites young People to follow *Sights* and *Shews* with an unbounded Eagerness, is nothing else than a natural Affection implanted by their Creator, to excite them to the future Acquisition of useful *Knowledge*. Those Shepherds who first amused themselves with observing the seeming Rotation of the Stars round this Globe of Earth, little thought of the great Use which their Observations might in length of Time be applied to, in the Mensuration of Time, and the Improvement of Commerce. The Child that is pleased with hearing its own Praise, does not consider that this Passion was implanted in him to excite him afterwards to such actions as are truly praise-worthy.

thy. Nor does the Child, that smiles, and is delighted with the chearful Countenance of its Nurse, or who, on the contrary, is affected with Grief when she is dejected and seems to weep, consider that this sympathetic Sense of Pleasure and Pain was given it to make it rejoice, when it is further grown up in Years, at the Happiness of others, and to commiserate their Distresses. And yet this is the Origin of *Compassion*, and was the Use designed by the Creator for these Sensations, and is generally the natural Effect of them.

Every thing that we call beautiful, that is, which gives Pleasure to the Eye, is generally more useful in its kind than those that are ugly and deformed. Thus it is that the most beautiful Horses are generally the best Horses; and the most beautiful Cows are generally the best Cows; and yet the same Shape that is beautiful in a Horse, is ~~other~~ otherwise in a Cow; because they were intended for different Uses. But does a Child, or a more grown-up Person, who is delighted with the Sight of a fine Horse, always consider this? Few Smells are disagreeable but what are unwholesome; but does a Child consider this when it is pleased with the Smell of a Rose, and displeased at other Smells that are always disgusting? If we examine the whole Catalogue of  
all



all our Passions, or of every Sensation that naturally produceth either Pleasure or Pain, we shall find them all end in the same Point; and by pursuing the Thought will find, that moral Good and moral Evil take their Origin from natural Good and natural Evil; that is, that nothing is recommended as a Duty, but what is useful; and nothing prohibited but what is hurtful.

Now as all our Pleasures and all our Pains may in the general be divided into sensual and intellectual, according as they are excited in us either by our internal or external Senses; so, as soon as they begin to operate and furnish us with the Ideas either of sensual or intellectual Pleasures, we naturally pursue the one and avoid the other. And as these Sensations, or natural Affections, are different in different Men, this occasions that Difference which we find in the natural Dispositions of several different Persons, which is known in *English* by the Name of *Taste*, and in *French* by the Word *Sentiment*.

Which *Taste*, though it may afterwards be improved or corrected by Education and Culture, must nevertheless, like the Spirit of Poetry, be in some Degree, born with us.

—*Ego nec studium sine divite vena,  
Nec rude quid profit video ingenium, alterius sic  
Altera poscit opem res & conjurat amice :*

says *Horace*. And as we see in Nature that though the Diamond must be polished by Art before it will give forth its full Lustre ; yet that, when this is done, no counterfeit can ever equal its Perfections ; so it is with regard to human Qualifications, which are not conferred on all alike ; Experience daily convincing us that there are some Persons born with a Talent or *Taste* for perceiving those Beauties : (for Instance ; in Painting, or Poetry or Music) which escape the Admiration of the Vulgar ; and arrive with Ease at a Mastery in those Sciences, which the utmost Diligence and Industry would never confer upon others. And here I must observe, that the Word *Beauty*, though it properly belongs only to the Sense of Seeing, yet is metaphorically transferred to denote any Object which gives us Pleasure, either with regard to our external, or internal Senses. And therefore, we do not only make use of it to denote those agreeable Objects which give Delight to our Eyes, and Ears, &c. but also to the Mind ; and hence come those Expressions of the *Beauty of Poetry*,

*Poetry, the Beauty of Virtue, and the Beauty of Holiness, &c.*

Now, though there is no Body but what is naturally struck with Beauty in general, whether it relates to the internal or external Senses; yet does the *Taste* for this Beauty differ very greatly in different Men. As for Example, in those Arts already specified of Painting or Music, which regard the outward Senses, some Persons are naturally pleased with those Parts of either that are delicately and tenderly touched; while others are affected with no Colours but what are glaring, and no Music but what is as piercing as the Clangor of a Trumpet. In like manner with regard to the inward Senses, and our Relish for intellectual Pleasures, all Men think, but all Men do not think alike; and there is as much Difference, at least, in the intellectual Taste of Pleasures as in the sensual.

Every Man has his particular *Taste*; of which the first Ode in *Horace* gives a lively Representation; and mentions the Author's own particular *Taste* among the rest. In Imitation of whom I must acknowledge, that there is a Pleasure in Thinking, and in thinking freely, for which I feel so strong a *Taste* in myself (pardon the Egotism) that no worldly Consideration ever yet did, and,  
I trust

I trust in God, never will get the better of it. There is a Pleasure in shaking off the Trammels of the Schools, and in opening the Mind to a Freedom of Thought, that is as much preferable, in my Opinion, to all systematical Thinking, as walking in the open Fields is to following the high Road, and treading in a beaten Track.

The same Objects of Love, Compassion, Friendship, Grief, Benevolence, Justice, Honour, &c. do not strike all Men alike. There is a *Sensibility*, or Delicacy of *Taste*, or *Sentiment*, in some Mens Natures, which makes the Ideas that are excited in them by these Objects affect them very differently from others. Mens Fears and Hopes are very different; one Man is bold, intrepid, and daring, while another is cautious, diffident, and timid. One Man is only affected with such Pleasures as are immediate, gross, and sensual; while others of a more refined natural Constitution are delighted with distant Expectations and intellectual Pleasures. A Man of a dull phlegmatic Genius can never form to himself any Notion of the Pleasure which *Archimedes* felt when he ran like a Madman about the Streets with Joy, for having found out the true Weight of a piece of adulterated Gold.

But



But then you will say, where is the Morality of all this? Where is the Merit of having any of those *Tastes* or *Sentiments* which are only given to us by Nature? If one Man is by Nature inclined to Benevolence, and another is by Nature cross and peevish, why should they be either of them rewarded or punished for that which was not their own doing? And if Mankind have no Abilities for doing Good *which they did not receive*, why should they glory, or expect a Reward, *as if they had not received them?* [f].

To which the Answer is, that Rewards and Punishments do naturally belong to free Actions, and to no others. And therefore Nobody can be either rewarded, or punished, for those Passions or natural Dispositions which belong to the Frame of his Constitution; nor for any other Graces bestowed on him by Providence, even in a supernatural Manner. Nor can he be any further accountable either for the Enjoyment, or the Want of them, than as he hath by the Act of his own Will given Encouragement, or Discouragement to them. For though we cannot command the supernatural Graces, nor entirely eradicate and extirpate our natural Passions, yet we may by

[f] 1 Cor. iv. 7.

Industry and Care cultivate and improve them. We may by Habit and Custom add Strength and Vigour both to our good and bad Dispositions ; or may by Habit and Custom so reduce their Force, as almost to extinguish them.

Most Children have an Aversion to the Taste of Wine and Tobacco, and yet daily Experience may convince us how this Affection can be changed by Education or Habit. Women are by nature generally more modest and tender-hearted than Men, and yet, when they have once got an Habit to the contrary, they are frequently more immodest and more cruel. So that the Merit or Demerit of all our Actions depends upon ourselves; and will be estimated according to the Pains we have taken to cultivate our good Dispositions and correct our bad ones; every Action being denominated either morally good, or morally bad, just so far as the Will hath concurred towards that Action. And hence it is, that the Expression of an *Original Sin* is a Contradiction in Terms; for as the Word *Sin* implies an Act of the Will, so the Word *Original* implies the direct contrary; and supposes the criminal Act to have been committed by another Person, to which Act that Person, to whom the *Sin* is imputed, neither contribut-

ed by Thought, Word, nor Deed. To be born of wicked, careless, or unhealthy Parents, may be a Misfortune, but cannot possibly be a Fault. For, as *Juvenal* says,

—*Patitur pœnas peccandi sola voluntas ;  
Nam scelus intra se tacitum qui cogitat ullum,  
Facti crimen habet.*

And accordingly the Merit or Demerit of all moral Agency depends upon the Will, whether we are able to put our Intentions in Execution or not. And therefore the Definition of human Liberty given by Mr. *Hume*, cannot be true, when he says, that LIBERTY is the Power of acting or not acting according to the Determinations of the Will, which, indeed, is one Species of Liberty, when this Word is made-use-of in Opposition to bodily Constraint ; but is not that Liberty which is opposed to Necessity, and in which the Morality of our Actions consists, where the Intention is the Thing regarded, and not the Execution. For, when we once will an Action, the Action immediately and necessarily follows, if it be in our Power to perform it. And hence it is, that he who looketh on a Woman to lust after her, is guilty of the Crime of Adultery, though he should not be able to

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accomplish his Desires, because he *hath committed Adultery already with her in his Heart.*

If then this be not the Kind of Liberty which we mean, when we speak of the Freedom of the human Will, you will perhaps object, with Mr. *Hume*, that we have no Liberty at all; for, says he, "Liberty, when  
" opposed to Necessity, not to Constraint, is  
" the same thing with Chance, which is uni-  
" versally allowed to have no *Existence* [g]." And this he endeavours to prove by shewing, that the Will cannot will without some Motive, that the Actions of the Will have a constant and regular Conjunction with Motives, and Causes, and Characters, and Circumstances, and are the necessary Result of such Conjunction. For, says he, "though Mens Temper-  
" pers may vary, they have their certain  
" Causes, though not easily discernible, as  
" much as Wind, or Rain, or any other  
" Change of Weather [b]." From whence follows, according to this Method of Reasoning, "that God must be the Author of Evil,  
" and Man entirely blameless! As he that  
" fires a Mine is answerable for all the Con-

[g] Vol. ii. p. 152.

[b] Vol. ii. p. 141.

sequences,



“sequences, whether the Train be long or  
 “short [i].” And concludes with saying, “to  
 “reconcile the Indifference and Contingency  
 “of human Actions with Prescience; or to  
 “defend absolute Decrees, and yet free the  
 “Deity from being the Author of Sin, has  
 “been found hitherto to exceed all the Skill  
 “of Philosophy [k].”

Let us, however, not be dismayed; Truth  
 is worth the searching after, and if we take  
 a little Pains, possibly we may find a Clue to  
 lead us out of this Labyrinth. In order to  
 which, I shall first endeavour to explain some  
 of the most remarkable Passages in Scripture,  
 upon which this Doctrine of Predestination  
 and absolute Decrees, is founded. The first  
 of which is that noted Passage in St. Paul's  
 Epistle to the *Romans*, where he says, *For*  
*whom God did foreknow, he also did predesti-*  
*nate to be conformed to the Image of his Son,*  
*that he might be the first among many Bre-*  
*thren. Moreover whom he did predestinate,*  
*them he also called [l].* Now, our Saviour  
 hath positively assured us, that *though many be*  
*called, yet but few are chosen [m].* Whence it

[i] Id. *ibid.* 157. [k] Id. *ibid.* 162. [l] Rom. viii. 29, 30.  
 [m] Mat. xx. 16, 22, 24.

appears, that Persons may be *foreknown* of God, and may be *predestinated* to be *called* to be conformed to the Image of his Son, and yet not be *chosen*. That is, they may be foreknown of God, and may be predestinated to be *called*, and yet not answer the End of their Calling.

Whence it is manifest, that although God may foreknow whom he will be graciously pleased to call, and may predestinate his Grace or Favour, in calling them, to be conferred only on some particular Persons, he nevertheless leaveth those Persons to the Exercise of their own Free-Will in determining whether *they will answer this Call* or not. And hence it is that St. Paul in this Epistle to the *Romans*, when speaking of the Grace or Favour of God which was conferred on *all Nations* by the Mission of *Jesus Christ*, says, *Among which are ye also* THE CALLED of *Jesus Christ*. And addresses his Epistle to *all that be in Rome beloved of God called to be Saints*: though it is to be feared that *all they who were in Rome* did not answer this End of their Calling. And hence also it is that St. Peter styles *all the strangers throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia*, to whom he writes, whether they were real Saints or not, *the Elect according to the Foreknowledge*

*knowledge of God.* Where it is to be observed that the Word *Elect* or *Chosen* in this Place is not used in the same limited Sense, as it is in the forementioned Quotation from St. *Matthew*, where it is said, that though many are *called*, yet few are *chosen*; but in a more extensive Sense, so as to comprehend all that were called: Because, it was of God's *free Grace* or *Choice* that they were called, upon which Account alone it is that they are in this Place said to be the *Elect* or the *Chosen*. Whereas in the other Place, the Word *chosen* is limited to such only as should answer this *Call*. When therefore the *Elect* are mentioned in Scripture in general Terms, and this *Election* is said to be of *Grace* [n], we are to understand it as meaning no more than the Word *called*; and accordingly, St. *Peter* in his Second Epistle [o], makes use of them as convertible Terms, when he says, *Wherefore the rather, Brethren, give Diligence to make your Calling and Election sure*. Whence also it appears, that, altho' their Calling or Election proceeded from the Grace of God, yet, that the making the Benefit thereof *sure* to themselves, depended upon their own Diligence.

[n] Rom. xi. 5.

[o] 2 Pet. i. 10.

It is further also manifest, from what hath been said, that this *Election*, or *Calling*, or *Predestination*, which depended on the Foreknowledge of God, consisted only in that general Call which was first offered to the *Jews*, and then to all Mankind, of Salvation, thro' Faith in *Jesus Christ*, which was undoubtedly owing to the free Grace and Favour of God, that it was at all offered, or preached unto Mankind: But which Salvation, however, was afterwards in their own Election, whether they would accept of, and abide by it, or not. And therefore, St. *Paul*, in his Epistle to the *Ephesians*, though he assureth them that God, even the Father of our Lord *Jesus Christ*, hath CHOSEN us in him before the Foundation of the World, that we should be holy and without Blame before him in Love; having predestinated us unto the Adoption of Children by *Jesus Christ* to himself according to the good Pleasure of his Will [p]; yet was so sensible of the Liberty which the *Ephesians* had in themselves, either of accepting or rejecting this Call, that he earnestly beseebeth them to walk worthy of the Vocation wherewith they were called; and to put on the whole Armour of God, that they may be able to

[p] Eph. i. 4.

stand



*stand against the Wiles of the Devil* [q]. Which it would be unnecessary for them to do, if this Predestination was to be understood in such a Manner as that each of these particular Persons were, by the absolute Decrees of God, predestinated to accept of, and follow this Rule of Salvation. Whereas the Meaning is, not that they were predestinated to accept, but that they were predestinated to have it offered unto them, which makes a wide Difference.

By the same Method of Interpretation also may those Texts of Scripture be explained, which speak of particular Places of Happiness and Misery that are *prepared* for the Righteous and for the Wicked. Which Preparation must not be understood to refer to the particular Persons, but to the Places which are prepared for the Righteous or the Wicked in general; that is, for those who shall deserve them. As for Example, when our Saviour says, *To sit on my Right Hand, or my Left, is not mine to give, but it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared of my Father* [r]. That is, for those who shall best deserve it; it being for such that this high Degree of Honour was prepared, or prede-

[q] Eph. iv. 1, 6, 11. [r] Mat. xx. 23.

stinated, by the Father. In the same Sense also must be understood that Parable, where our Saviour represents himself as saying at the Day of Judgment to those on his Right Hand, *Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom PREPARED for you from the Foundation of the World.* And to those on the Left, *Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting Fire PREPARED for the Devil and his Angels* [s]. Not that these particular Places were prepared for these particular Persons; but that these Places were prepared for those who should deserve them. In which Sense I can venture to assert, that all the eminent Fathers of the Church whom I have met with, till the Time of *Calvin*, understand these Texts of Scripture. But, as what *Justin Martyr* [t] says upon this Subject, is both strong and short, I shall only quote him at present. Whose Words are these: “ By the immutable Decree of Fate, we mean no more, than that there are suitable Rewards prepared for those who chuse Righteousness; and suitable Punishments for the Wicked.”

So that the Meaning of these Texts of Scripture is this, that God, from the Foundation of the World, predestinated or prepared a

[s] *Matt. xxv. 34, 41.*[t] *Just. Apol. i.*

Place of Happiness for the Reward of good Men, and a Place of Torment for the Punishment of bad ones. And that they who are called, and answer the End of their Calling, shall, at the last Day, be admitted into that Kingdom, or State of Happiness, which was *prepared* or *predestinated* for them from the Foundation of the World, where they shall be remunerated with such Degrees of Felicity as shall be proportionate to their particular Merit; or, in the Language of the Scriptures, where they shall be rewarded *according to their Works*, and *every Man shall receive his own Reward, according to his own Labour*. Whereas they who are called and do not answer the End of their Call, shall be dismissed into that Place of Torment, which was *prepared* for the Rebellious. Thus it is, that Houses of Correction may be said to be *prepared* or *predestinated* for Vagabonds; and that Prisons are built and predestinated by human Legislators for Thieves and Murderers, without impeaching the Liberty of the human Will; there being an immense Difference between predestinating particular Places for particular Persons according to their Desert; and predestinating particular Persons to particular Places, whether they deserve to be sent thither or not. For in the one



Case, the Doctrine of Rewards and Punishments is consistent with the Freedom of Man, and the Justice of God; whereas in the other Case, it is impossible to reconcile it with either.

Having thus removed out of our Way all the Objections which are raised to the Freedom of Man's Will from the scriptural Expressions of *Predestination* and *Election*; there nevertheless still remains the Difficulty of reconciling the Foreknowledge of God, and the Liberty of Man; with regard to which, here we may safely hold: That as there are some Propositions in almost all the Sciences, which, though manifestly true, are nevertheless attended with great, if not unsurmountable Difficulties; so a wise Man would, in the present Case, rather chuse to abide by that which appears most certain, though he is not able to answer all the Objections which may be raised against it, than to remain in a State of Scepticism and Uncertainty. And if of Consequence there appears to be any Contradiction between the Foreknowledge of God and the Freedom of Man, as stated by Mr. *Hume*, it should seem much more reasonable to give up the Foreknowledge of God in that particular, than either to impeach, or even doubt



doubt about, the Freedom of Man, or the Justice of God.

As to the common Apology, that our Actions are not performed because God foreknows them; but that God foreknows them, because we will do them; these are only so many Sounds without Sense: For if God foreknows that we will do them, we infallibly *must* do them. But what Mr. *Locke* says upon this Head in one of his Letters to Mr. *Molyneux*, is very strong: " If (says he) you will argue for or against Liberty from Consequences, I will not undertake to answer you. For I own freely to you the Weakness of my Understanding, that tho' it be unquestionable that there is Omnipotence and Omniscience in God our Maker; and I cannot have a clearer Preception of any Thing, than that I am free; yet I cannot make Freedom in Man consistent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any Truths I most firmly assent to. And therefore I have long since given off the Consideration of that Question, resolving all into this short Conclusion: That if it be possible for God to make a free Agent, then Man is free, though I see not the Way of it."

After Mr. *Locke* had given up the Consideration of this Subject, it may perhaps seem presumptuous in me to undertake it; but when I consider that, if it be not possible for God to make a free Agent, we must also give up the noble Attribute of God's Justice; because then he could have no Opportunity of exercising it; I am tempted to pursue the Thought. For I own that it gives me an elevated Idea not only of the Goodness, but the Justice of God, when I consider him as acting, not as an arbitrary Being in the final Distribution of Happiness to the several intelligent moral Agents which he hath created, whether they be Men or Angels; but as a just God, which he could not be, were there no Creatures on whom he had conferred a Freedom of Will, and upon whom he might exercise his Attribute of Justice, by dispensing of Rewards or Punishments in proportion as they *loved Righteousness, and hated Iniquity*. Whereas by making them *free*, they are now enabled to contribute to their own Happiness, to work out their own Salvation, and to supply the Almighty with proper Objects for the Exercise of his Justice; according to which, not according to his own despotic Will and Power,

Power, *he anointeth them with the Oil of Gladness above their Fellows* [u].

Let us therefore not be discouraged from attempting to proceed a little further than Mr. *Locke* has done, which possibly we may be able to effect by enquiring what is meant by the two Words *Omnipotence* and *Omniscience*. By the Word *Omnipotence* is meant no more than to denote God's Almighty Power in being able to do every Thing that is possible to be done, consistently with the Nature of Things, and his other Attributes; but not that he can do every Thing. For he cannot act a Contradiction; he cannot either deceive or be deceived; he cannot create, nor otherwise produce, another Being equal to, or independent of, himself; he cannot prefer Evil to Good, &c. In like Manner God's Omniscience must be bounded in its Definition, by every Thing which it is possible for him to know, consistent with the Nature of Things and his other Attributes. If therefore it be inconsistent with the Nature of Things for God to foreknow the contingent Actions of a free Agent, the Consequence must be this; either that there is no such Being as a free Agent, God alone excepted; or that God

[u] Pf. xlv. 6, 7. Heb. i. 8, 9.



does not foreknow their free Actions. And if I am to assent to one or other of these Propositions, I would chuse to deny God's Foreknowledge of the Actions of free Agents, rather than the Existence of other free Agents besides God. Because, I cannot be more certain of my own Existence, than I am of my Freedom. The Consciousness of the one strikes me full as strongly, as of the other. And I cannot be better assured that I hear, or see, or taste, or smell, than I am of the inward Sensation which I *feel* within myself of the Liberty of my own Will. And I think it would be full as easy for any Man to persuade me that I do not exist, as that I do not sometimes hesitate, and doubt, and sometimes determine, or resolve, and prefer one Action to another, after such Doubts or Hesitations are at an End. And when we consider that it depended upon God's own free Will whether he would make a free Creature or not; it seems no way derogatory to the Honour of God to suppose, that he might dispense with the Exercise of those Powers in himself, which were inconsistent with that Freedom which he had conferred upon Man.

And when we further consider, that this Freedom of the Will is not inconsistent with bodily Restraint, so that the Will may be  
free,



free, though the Body is not able to put the Determinations of the Will in Execution; such a Liberty as this, though incompatible with the Foreknowledge of God, can be attended with no possible Inconvenience; because the constant Interposition of God's Almighty Power, which is the necessary Consequence of his *Omnipresence*, may either restrain the Execution of any human Designs, which are inconsistent with the Scheme of his general Providence, or many direct them to Purposes different from their first Intention: So that although *many are the Devices of Man's Heart, yet the Counsel of the Lord that shall stand*. And therefore, I do not think it reflects more upon the *Omniscience* of God to say, that he cannot foreknow the free contingent Actions of Men, than it does upon his *Omnipotence*, to say that he cannot act a Contradiction.

But supposing we should allow that God does not foreknow the free contingent Actions of Man, yet, as I before observed, if the Will is always regulated by some Motive or other, and the Action necessarily follows the Determination of the Will, as the Will necessarily follows Pleasure; I see you will now ask wherein can human Liberty consist? To which I answer, that it consists in our choo-  
sing

sing that which seems to be the greatest Plea-  
 sure from amongst a great Variety of Plea-  
 sures, either real or apparent. For the Mind  
 of Man before it *will*s has a Power of *hesita-*  
*ting*, and *doubting*, whether it will *Will* this  
 or that particular Pleasure or not. That is,  
 among the various Motives which occur to  
 the human Mind, it has a Power of choosing  
 that, which, upon Deliberation, appears to be  
 the most eligible. It cannot will *Pain* as  
*Pain*, or, which is the same Thing, *Evil* as  
*Evil*. But as Pain may be productive of Plea-  
 sure, and Pleasure of Pain, the Mind of Man  
 has a Power of debating within itself, and  
 weighing the several Arguments, or Motives,  
 which ought to determine its Choice before  
 it *will*; and may be *inclined* different Ways,  
 before it really determines.

The Progress and Procedure of the Mind  
 in *willing*, seems to be analogous to its Power  
 in *believing*; when the Evidence on both  
 Sides is produced and duly considered, the  
 Assent of the Mind, or the Consent of the  
 Will, must necessarily preponderate on that  
 Side on which the greatest Evidence lies;  
 but if in this Disquisition, the Mind will not  
 always impartially attend to the Evidence,  
 will not hear what is to be said on both Sides,  
 or look into the Consequences of Things, then

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that which is the weakest Evidence in Reality, may appear to be the strongest; and the Mind will yield its Assent, or Consent, in that Case, on the Side of *Error*, but still under the Imagination of its being at that Time, and under those Circumstances, either the most valuable Truth, or the most eligible Pleasure.

The Freedom therefore of the Human Mind seems to consist in the Power, which is given it by the Creator, of suspending its Assent or Consent, till it has Time to consider the Evidence that is produced on both sides, together with all its Consequences. And the Merit of believing or willing what is Right, does not consist either in the *Belief*, or *Will*, but in our impartial Consideration of the Subject in Debate; which will always depend upon our keeping our Bodies, and our Mind, in such a due Temperature, as that all our Faculties and natural Affections may, upon occasion, be exerted to the utmost Degree of their Strength, according to the Talents which hath been assigned us by our Creator; so as to be able to make an impartial Enquiry into the Subject before us, and give our Assent or Consent on the right Side of the Question, and in Favour of that Truth, or of that Pleasure, which is, in Reality, the most estimable. And hence it was that I as-

serted in that Paragraph of the *Essay on Spirit*, before quoted, that "Virtue, Wisdom, Prudence, &c. in Mankind, may be considered only as various Names for the several Powers given to them, and the different Methods used by them, in the Attainment of Happiness, and avoiding of Misery." That is, Virtue in the general, or Wisdom, Prudence, Fortitude, &c. in the particular, are only to be considered as useful Qualifications, in Proportion to the Power they have to produce or procure Happiness.

The original *Latin* Word for Virtue is *Virtus*, which, according to *Cicero*, is derived from *Vir*, a *Man*, and accordingly was originally applied to signify only the *manly* Perfection of [*x*] *Fortitude*; but has since been metaphorically extended to denote any Power, or Perfection, either in animate or inanimate Creatures, whereby they are enabled to do Good: Thus we talk of the Virtues of Plants, &c. And in moral intelligent Agents, those Qualifications are called Virtues, which con-

[*x*] The *Greek* Word for Virtue is *ἄρετή*, which is likewise supposed to be derived from *ἄρεσις*, *Mars*; that is, the *Greeks* and *Romans* borrowed the general Denomination of Virtue, from that particular Virtue, or manly Qualification of Fortitude, which was most in Esteem among them. And accordingly, the modern *Italians* call a Skill in the Arts of Statuary, and Painting, and Architecture, by the Name of *Vertù*.

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tribute to the Perfection of their Natures, and enable them to do the most Good both to themselves and others.

And as Mr. *Hume* [y], when speaking of the Love of one's Country, observes, that "as  
 " Nature has implanted in every one a superior Affection to his own Country, we never expect any Regard to distant Nations, where the smallest Competition arises. Not to mention that while every Man consults the Good of his own Community, we are sensible that the general Interest of Mankind is better promoted, than by any loose indeterminate Views to the Good of a Species, whence no beneficial Action could ever result, for want of a duly limited Object, on which they could exert themselves."

So this method of Reasoning may be continued down from the whole World, and any one particular Society, to any one Society, and the particular Members of that Society. And demonstrably sheweth the Use of Self-Love in the particular Persons of which that Society is composed: The Interest and Advantage of which is better consulted by every one taking Care of himself, *than by any loose indeterminate Views of public Good.*

[y] Vol. iii. p. 93.

You will then perhaps ask, When is it that Self-Love becomes a Crime? To which the Answer is, Never but when it acts against itself, and in such a Manner as, either immediately or mediately, to prejudice and hurt its own Interest. He that hurts his Country, in the End either hurts himself or his Posterity, even in this World. And he that for the Sake of any present Pleasure is guilty of a Sin, will generally find at long Run, that he has acted to his own Detriment. Therefore as Vice solicits us with the Temptation of present and immediate Pleasures, so it requires a prudent Forecast to look into the Consequences of Things, in order to prevent our mistaking our apparent, for our real Happiness. And as the rejecting of present Pleasures, must be attended with present Pain and Uneasiness, so it requires frequently a Strength and Wisdom of Conduct to preserve us in a steady Course of Mortification, or Self-Denial, only in Expectation of meeting with a greater Degree of Happiness in Futurity. Not that there is any Virtue in Mortification for Mortification Sake, nor in refusing the present Gratification of our Passions, when it is not attended with some bad Consequence either to ourselves, or others. For our Passions, or Affections, were all given to us that we might gratify them;

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we are allowed the Use of them; our chief Care ought therefore to be, not to abuse them. And hence appears also the Folly of those who mistake *Penance* for *Repentance*; the former of which cannot possibly meet with any Acceptance in the Eye of a good God, but just so far as it contributes to the Production of the latter.

And accordingly, when any Contest ariseth in the Mind between a present and a future Pleasure, the true Question is, which of the two will tend to our greater Happiness in general, when all Circumstances are considered? And which ever upon the whole appears to be such, the Will, on Account of its Self-Love, will necessarily determine on that Side upon which the greatest apparent Pleasure lies. But as we are bred up for many Years together with a Relish only for sensual Pleasures, it being several Years after our Birth before we arrive at so much strength of Reason as to have a Relish for intellectual Pleasures, these latter come to a Disadvantage, and neither affect us so speedily, nor so strongly as the others. And therefore, it is the Business of Reason and Religion to bring in some Counterbalance, some superior Weight of future Pleasure, in order to turn the Scale in their own Favour.

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I am not ignorant that many People choose to excuse themselves from Guilt, by laying the Blame of all their transgressions on *Original Sin*. But, if they would consult their own Breasts, and look a little more narrowly at Home, they need not go so far Abroad for a Reason. The natural Tendency of Mankind to sensual Pleasures, or what is commonly called *the Corruption of our Nature*, is the necessary Consequence of a tedious Infancy, during which Time we are entirely governed by our sensual Appetites, which, from the very Frame of our Nature, as at present constituted, must have had an Advantage over our intellectual Faculties, whether our first Parents had transgressed or not. And, indeed, if there was no Difficulty in conquering our Passions, and the Force they acquire by an early Indulgence of them, this World would be no State of Probation and Trial; which, however, is the true Light in which it ought always to be considered.

But the great Power and Prevalency of our sensual Desires, even after we arrive at the Use of our Reason, may in a great Measure be attributed to the Want of a proper Care having been taken of us during our younger Years, by our own immediate Parents, without going so far back as to *Adam* and *Eve*.

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For the Misfortune is, that Children, instead of being rightly instructed, are too often taught in their Infancy to value those Things which they ought to be taught to despise; and to despise those Things which they ought really and truly to esteem. And before they are sensible how pernicious a Thing it is to suffer themselves to be governed by their Passions, they are not suffered to have any other Governors. They are indulged in every Thing their Hearts can desire, and their Will is their Law. By which means they gain such a Bent towards sensual Pleasures, and such an Habit in gratifying themselves in them, that it requires the most powerful Correctives to amend it afterwards, and to bring such Children, when they are grown up, to a Relish for rational and intellectual Pleasures, if it be ever, without the extraordinary Assistance of God's Grace, able to effect it. And accordingly, the wise Son of *Sirach* says, *Hast thou Children? instruct them, and bow down their Neck from their Youth. He, that maketh too much of his Son, shall bind up his Wounds, and his Bowels will be troubled at every Cry. An Horse not broken becometh headstrong: and a Child left to itself will be wilfull.*

It was indeed a great Happiness peculiarly bestowed on our first Parents, that they were  
brought

brought into the World with all their intellectual Faculties in full Perfection; unbiaſſed by the Follies of Infancy, or the Prejudice of Education. For in this reſpect they were both made *upright*, as *Solomon* [z] expreſſeth it; and had thereby an Advantage given them by God, which all their Poſterity have ever ſince been deprived of. But with Regard to all the Progeny of *Adam*, they come into the World in a State of Infancy and Childhood; whereby they naturally and neceſſarily acquire Habits of Senſuality, and carnal Affections, before they come to the Uſe of their Reaſon; which Habits grow up with them, and gather Strength by their Indulgence, till they frequently grow too ſtrong to be reſtrained either by the Power of Reaſon or Religion. Which was not the Caſe with *Adam* and *Eve*: And if they tranſgreſſed in that purer State of Life, and under thoſe advantageous Circumſtances, what can be expected from their Poſterity?

But then you will ſay, perhaps, what becomes of public Spirit, Friendſhip, Gratitude, Generoſity, and all the benevolent Affections? They are where they were. The Seeds of them are all implanted in our Natures, and

( z ) Eccleſ. vii. 29.

the Practice of them is all founded on Self-Love; for, if the friendly, good-natured, benevolent, or generous Man, had not more Pleasure in Acts of Friendship, Benevolence, or Generosity, than in the contrary Actions, he would never do them; any more than the avaricious Man would deny himself all the Comforts of Life, and subject himself to public Contempt, only for the Pleasure of heaping up Gold.

*Ut quidam memoratur Athenis  
Sordidus ac dives, populi contemnere voces  
Sic solitus: Populus me fibilat, at mihi plaudo  
Ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca.*

HOR. Sat.

And hence it appears, that Virtue can only be its own Reward, to such Persons as have a *Taste* for Virtue, and who have not by contrary Habits vitiated that *Taste*. But since, as I before observed, we may, by Education and Habit, almost quite change our Natures, and make them either much better, or much worse, than they were originally, Reason and Religion are given us as Assistants in Aid of Virtue, by throwing into the Scale the advantageous Prospect of superior Rewards in a future State. For, as Cicero observes, "It is impossible for  
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“ those who have no Belief of the Immortality  
 “ of the Soul, or a future State of Rewards or  
 “ Punishments, to sacrifice their particular  
 “ Interests and Passions to the public Good, or  
 “ to have a generous Concern for Posterity.”

But forasmuch as the Doctrine of a future State was but faintly received by the World till the Time of the coming of our Saviour ; having been positively asserted but by a few of the Learned, denied by many, and disputed by most ; therefore, in order to quiet Mens Minds and relieve them from the uncertain Disputes of Philosophy it was, that a Person of such high Dignity as *the Son of God* was sent with Power from on high, to establish this Doctrine and *bring Life and Immortality to Light through the Gospel*: That we might thereby be enabled to correct all our evil Habits, prevent our sensual Desires from being too headstrong, and confine our natural Affections within their due Bounds. For as our Will can never chuse any Thing but under the Appearance of Good ; we are now enabled to prove, that he who forsakes Virtue, and goes over to the Side of Vice, will be a Loser by the Exchange ; and that, as he would make but a foolish Bargain, who sold a valuable Reversion for a present Trifle, so ALL WICKEDNESS IS FOLLY. And on the other hand it appears, that the  
 present



present restraining of our Appetites from all unlawful Gratifications, which are only unlawful because they are hurtful, will, in the End, turn out to their Advantage; and will some Time or other, either in this World or in the next, or in both, produce a greater Quantity of Pleasure, than we could possibly have had from the Gratification of them. And does not all this terminate in Self-Love?  
*Q. E. D.*

As to the other Parts of the *Essay on Spirit* which relate to the *Atbanasian* Creed, I have yet met with nothing in Answer to it which deserves my particular Notice; most of the Authors, who have hitherto appeared against it, having avoided all Argumentation, and only attacked it by the Way of Irony and affected Humour. And although these Gentlemen would take it very ill to be called the Disciples of that Lord *Shaftsbury* who wrote the *Characteristicks*, yet they follow his Advice, and have chose to try a religious Subject by the Test of Banter and Ridicule.

The Existence of [a] *Angels*, or *Spirits* was, I make no doubt, a Fund of Merriment to the *Saducean* Scoffers, at the Time of our Saviour's coming into the World; and Religion, as well as Learning, hath been often the Ob-

[a] Acts xxiii. 8.

ject of Ridicule before now. For the Power of setting serious Subjects in a ludicrous Light, is no uncommon Talent, and may easily be acquired; but, I believe, it was never yet attempted by any one who had the real Interest either of Religion or Learning truly at Heart. But a late Writer, whose Performance is entitled, *The genuine Sequel to the Essay on Spirit, &c.* has not only done this, but hath gone further; and has assumed the Person of the Author of the *Essay*, and writes in his Name, that his Calumnies may strike with greater Force, as seemingly coming from the Author's own Mouth. Which is such a Piece of Deceit and Treachery, as none but a base and bad Mind could possibly stoop to, and be guilty of. A Ship that fights under false Colours, forfeits all Claim to our benevolent Regards, and is, by the Law of Nations, to be treated as a Pirate.

This Author then proceeds to describe the Author of the *Essay on Spirit*, that the Reader may know who he is, which if the Author of the *Essay* had been assiduous to conceal, as this Author seems to think he was, is against all the Rules of Decency and good Manners; and is a Piece of such low Spite and envenomed Malice, as a generous Mind would have been ashamed of. Whereas he might have saved himself

himself all that Trouble, since the Author of the *Essay* never made a Secret of his being such ; either to his Friends, or even to his Acquaintance, when they asked him about it. But the Reason why he did not add his Name to the Dedication was, because he had often observed, and as often lamented it, that Theological Disputants very seldom treat one another with that Politeness, or even Candour, which ought to be expected from a liberal Education ; and he had a Mind to disengage his Subject from all personal Reflexions, and personal Altercations. But this he finds is not to be done.

And, lest the Author of the *Essay* should not be effectually known, this Author mentions some Works as his which are already published, and to which the Author's Name is affixed ; and hints at others not yet published, but which must have been shewn in Confidence to some Person whom the Author of the *Essay* mistook for a Friend, and by whose pious Zeal the Secrets of the Closet were betrayed. *Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum !*

He asserts likewise, that I was assisted in the Performance of the *Essay*, and received the Hint of it from another Person ; but how he came to know this he does not say. Nor indeed

indeed does it signify the least to the Merit of the Argument, whether I was assisted or not. And I mention this only to shew what Credit ought to be given to this Gentleman's Assertions, when I, who should know best, solemnly declare, that I neither received the Hint, nor Assistance from any Man whatsoever: and that I wrote it with no other View than of endeavouring to ease *Christianity* from that Load of Error, in the *Athanasian* Exposition of the Doctrine of the Trinity, which hangs like a Mill-stone about the Neck of it. For to use this Author's own Words, *If the Trinity be a Mystery, let it remain so.*

Besides, I do not believe the most critical Eye can possibly discover any Difference either in the Style, or in the Manner of Reasoning, from one End of the *Essay on Spirit* to the other. Which is not the Case with the *Genuine Sequel*: The *Preface* being manifestly written by one Person; the *Body of the Book* by another, and the *Appendix* by a much better Pen than either. How these several Performances came to be jumbled together here in *Dublin*, is not worth my Enquiry. But if it be the Production of that *able and learned Club*, who, in the Spring of the Year 1752, republished Dean *Swift's* Sermon on the *Trinity*, with this Advertisement on the

Back



Back of the Title Page: ADVERTISEMENT  
 BY THE EDITOR. *Several Gentlemen of Abilities and Learning having undertaken to answer the ESSAY ON SPIRIT; yet as their Labours will require Time and great Consideration, it is thought necessary, in the Interim, to republish the following Sermon (written by the late Dean SWIFT) which in some measure may serve as a fit Preservative against the evil Effects of that Treatise. If, I say, this is the Production of the Labours of that learned Club, they have indeed been long in Labour only to bring forth a ridiculous Mouse [b].*

But then the Author further declares in my Name, that I have since retracted my Opinions advanced in the *Essay*, which I find has been industriously spread abroad in a serious Manner. And therefore I think it proper to declare, that I have met with no Answers, or Arguments, since the Publication of that Treatise, which have occasioned any Alteration in my Mind upon that Subject, but rather the contrary. For I cannot help

[b] Whoever has a Mind to see a Refutation of the several pretended Answers which have been published against the *Essay on Spirit*, and in particular of this Sermon of Dean Swift's, may consult a Pamphlet entitled, *A Defence of the Essay on Spirit*, published in London, and sold by J. Noon in the Poultry, G. Woodfall at Charing-Cross, and M. Cooper in Pater-Noster-Row; and reprinted in Dublin by G. Faulkner.

thinking

thinking, that must be a bad Cause, which stands in Need of Scurrility and Lies for its Defence, and whether there is much Wit in inventing of Falsehoods, I need not say; but sure I am there is much Wickedness.

Whatever was the Motive, either with this Author, or with myself, for appearing in Print, is known to the Searcher of all Hearts, from whom no Secrets are hid. And I beseech that Almighty Power to amend the Hearts of those, who had any other View than the Support of Christianity, and the Love of Truth. This, I hope, can give no Offence, for *I judge no Man, nay I judge not mine ownself*, but refer the Revelation and Determination of it, to that Day when the Secrets of all Hearts shall be open, and to that divine Person to whom all Judgment is COMMITTED.

In the mean Time, I could wish that those Writers who differ in Opinion from the Author of the *Essay*, would lay aside their Jokes, and personal Reflexions, and answer the Question proposed at the End of the *Essay*; not with the Grimace of Buffoons, but with Seriousness and Sobriety, as Christians and as Scholars should. Which is to this Effect. That if the Doctrine of the Trinity is a Mystery, why should any human Explanation of it

it be imposed as an Article of Faith? And why is this metaphysical Dispute made a Part of the public Service of the Church? The Author of the *Essay* is far from denying the Doctrine of the Trinity, or the Divinity of our Saviour, as revealed in the Scriptures; which is what these Authors would willingly suggest; but is disgusted with having the Explanation given of it by *Athanasius*, made a Rule of Faith; and therefore is desirous that that Creed which goes under his Name, and is allowed universally by the Learned to be a spurious Composition, should be omitted out of the Liturgy. Not that he desires any Explanation of his own, or of any body's else, except that which is commonly called the *Apostles Creed*, should be received instead of it.

His Design in that Treatise is therefore chiefly to shew, that much may be said against the *Athanasian Creed*; and that the Explanation of this Mystery, as contained therein, is far from being satisfactory. Because, as God the Father, and God the Son, are always represented in Scripture as two separate and distinct Agents, he concludes, for that Reason, that they cannot possibly be but one and the same individual Substance or Being. And because Reason, Revelation, and human Authority,



all combine in declaring for a Priority of Existence, as well as a Subordination of Power, between Father and Son, as the very Terms themselves imply; he concludes therefore, that they cannot be coeternal and coequal. For if there is such a Thing in Nature as a Contradiction in Terms, it must be to say, that a Son is coequal with his Father; or, as our Saviour observes, to assert, *that the Servant is equal to his Lord, or he that is sent equal to him that sent him.*

Since I wrote the above, I have received a Pamphlet from *England*, entitled, *An Answer to an Essay on Spirit.* By *Thomas Knowles*, M. A. and addressed, *by Permission*, to his Grace the Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury*. In which the Author endeavours to prove, that the *Essay on Spirit* was written by the Bishop of *Clogher*; and I own, that I cannot but be surprized, to find that *Dr. Herring* should lend his Name to the patronizing such a Piece of Unpolitness. The Author of the *Essay* has acknowledged himself to be a beneficed Clergyman belonging to the Church of *Ireland*, and declares that he thinks the Form of Christianity established in the Churches of *England* and *Ireland*, the best and purest Form that he knows of any where; but as these Churches deny all Claim to Infallibility,  
and



and as he thinks this Form might be amended by the Omission of the *Athanasian* Creed, he has humbly proposed this Omission to the Powers that be, and has assigned his Reasons for this Proposal.

I have above told the Reason why he did not choose to put his Name to the Title Page or Dedication; and I own I cannot see what any further Knowledge of the Author's Name or Title has to do with the Argument in Question: Nor do I know of any one moral, or good natured, Reason, that can be assigned for disclosing the Name of an Author, if he himself, for any prudential Reasons, has no Mind to have it divulged.

This Pamphlet in Answer to the *Essay*, is not written with Strength, or Knowledge, enough to deserve a particular Reply; but there are some Parts of it that may, however, require a little Notice to be taken of them.

As for Example, when this Author, and the rest of the Vindicators of the *Athanasian* Doctrine, want to make an Apology for the damnatory Clauses, they say, that "the condemning Clauses are to be understood as relating only to those who obstinately deny the Substance of the Christian Faith," but not the *Athanasian* Explanation of it [c]. And

[c] Knowles's Anf. p. 23.

again, that “ the damnatory Clauses in the  
 “ *Athanasian Creed* do not extend to every  
 “ minute Particular contained in it [d].” Or,  
 in the Words of Dean *Swift*, because “ the  
 “ *Athanasian Creed* containeth some nice and  
 “ philosophical Points which few People can  
 “ comprehend, the Bulk of Mankind is oblig-  
 “ ed to believe no more than the Scripture  
 “ Doctrine of it, as I have delivered it [e].”  
 In which Abstract of it, as given us by the  
 Dean, there is not one Word of the Unity of  
 Substance, or of the Coequality, or Coeternity  
 of the three Persons in the Trinity. And Mr.  
*Wheatly*, in his *Rational Illustration of the Book*  
*of Common Prayer*, says, that from the 3d and  
 4th Verses of the *Athanasian Creed*, to the  
 26th Verse, it requires our Assent no more  
 than a Sermon does ; which though it may be  
 true, we are not obliged to believe every Par-  
 ticular of it.

Whereas, if we consult the Creed itself,  
 and the Rubric joining to it, we shall find that  
 this Creed is ordered to be repeated by *the*  
*People* as well as by *the Minister*. Which  
 Creed, lest the minutest Particular of it should  
 be neglected, begins with declaring, that *Every*  
*one who doth not keep THIS Faith WHOLE and*  
*undefiled, shall without Doubt perish everlast-*

[d] Id. p. 114.

[e] Id. p. 110, 111, 114.

ingly. And then again towards the Middle asserts, that *he that will be saved must thus think of the Trinity*. And concludes with saying, *This is the Catholick Faith, which except A MAN believe faithfully, he cannot be saved*. So that if the positive Denunciations in this Creed be true, the Bulk of Mankind, if they are *Men*, will certainly be damned, if they do not believe every minute Particular of it.

And yet when Persons, who are offended at the Harshness of these damnatory Clauses, endeavour to weaken the Force of them, by shewing, that the Declaration of our Assent and Consent is by the Act of Uniformity only required, for Peace sake, *to the Use* of all things contained in the Book of Common Prayer, till their may be a proper Time for the Amendment of them; then it is said, that “ a  
 “ Clergyman, to whom is enjoined the con-  
 “ stant *Use* of the *Common Prayer*, in the Pre-  
 “ sence of God, and as the solemn Duty of  
 “ the Sanctuary, ought to be at all Times as  
 “ ready to give his unfeigned Assent to the  
 “ *Truth*, and Equity, of every Thing contained  
 “ in that Mode of Worship with which he  
 “ ventures to approach the Throne of Grace,  
 “ as he is willing to justify himself in *the Use*  
 “ of it; otherwise, he seems to betray the  
 “ Reasonableness and the Necessity of the Form  
 “ itself,

“itself, and that by thus equivocating with  
 “his own Conscience, he turns the public  
 “Worship of GOD into a solemn Piece of  
 “Mockery [ *f* ].”—How are these Things to  
 be reconciled?

But still further to confirm this Opinion of  
 his, Mr. Knowles is pleased to have Recourse  
 to the “36th Canon of the Church of England,  
 “*whereby every Clergyman is required to sub-*  
 “*scribe to the Articles willingly and EX ANI-*  
 “*MO, and to acknowledge all and every Arti-*  
 “*cle to be agreeable to the Word of GOD.*”  
 Whereas if this Subscription be understood  
 by him, as not only a Subscription for Peace  
 Sake, but as, “*an Assent to the Truth of every*  
 “*Thing contained therein;*” I desire to know  
 how Mr. Knowles will reconcile this with the  
 Oaths that he has taken to the Government.  
 For the thirty fifth Article of our Church de-  
 clares, that *the second Book of Homilies, the*  
*several Titles whereof are joined to this Article,*  
*doth contain a godly and wholesome Doctrine,*  
*and necessary for these Times.* The last Title  
 of which is *against Rebellion,* in which Homi-  
 ly the Doctrine of *Non-Resistance* and an *un-*  
*limited passive Obedience,* is declared to be the  
 Doctrine of *these Times,* and upon which the

[ *f* ] Knowles, p. 5.

Legitimacy



Legitimacy of the *Revolution*, and of the *Hanover* Succession depends, is founded on the Principles of Resistance, and limited Obedience; to which Mr. *Knowles*, when he was put into Orders, has both subscribed and sworn. And does not the bare stating of this plain Matter of Fact put the Doctrine of Subscriptions, as explained by Mr. *Knowles*, into too absurd a Light to require any further Argumentation? And is it not something unaccountable, that the Church should still persist in requiring a Subscription to the Doctrine of this Homily, at the same Time that every particular Member of that Church is continually subscribing and swearing to the direct contrary?

The Author of the *Essay on Spirit* had observed, that the *Nicene* Fathers must have understood the Words *Hypostasis* and *Usia* as meaning the same Thing, when they anathematized every one who should say THAT THE Son existed out of any other HYPOSTASIS, or USIA was the same with HYPOSTASIS, and had no other Signification, ἡ αὐτὴ τὸ οὖν, but that which is, or exists [g]. From whence the Author of the *Essay* argued thus, “to say “therefore that the three Persons in the Trinity are one *Usia* and three *Hypostases*, is the

[g] *Knowles*, p. 105.

“ same

“ same Thing as to say, that they are one Substance and three Substances at the same Time, &c.” In Answer to which, Mr. *Knowles* endeavours to shew, that there is a Difference between *Ufia* and *Hypostasis* [b]; and yet some few Pages before, he found Fault with our *English* Translation of the New Testament, in not rendering the *Greek* Word *Hypostasis* by the *English* Word *Substance*. For speaking of the Expression made Use of by St. *Paul*, when he calls the Son *the Brightness of God's Glory, and the express Image* ὡσαύτως, of his Person, Mr. *Knowles* adds, which should rather be rendered of his *Substance*. So inconsistent a Thing is Error with itself.

The Author of the *Essay on Spirit*, in his Quotation of the abovementioned Passage from *Athanasius*, had omitted the Words, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, as of no great Consequence; as really and in Truth they are not. Because the Dispute was not, what *Ufia* or *Hypostasis* signified, but whether the *Nicene* Fathers and *Athanasius* understood them to mean one and the same Thing, whatever that was; which was sufficiently proved that they did, from the former Part of the Quotation. And yet Mr. *Knowles* charges

[b] Id. p. 86.

the Author of the *Essay*, with having misrepresented the Meaning of *Athanasius* by this Omission. And here I cannot but observe, that this is the only Place which Mr. *Knowles* pretends to produce as an Instance where the Author of the *Essay* has made a false or imperfect Quotation from the Fathers, notwithstanding the pompous Declaration published in his Advertisements and Title Page, in which he ventures to assert, that the Author of the *Essay's Representation of the Opinion of the ancient Fathers, is unfair*. And to shew Mr. *Knowles's* great Learning in the Greek Tongue, he translates the Words ἡ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν, *unless Self-Existence*, for which a School-Boy should be whipped.

But what surprises me most is this, that Mr. *Knowles*, in explaining the Difference there is between *Usia* and *Hypostasis*, says, that *Athanasius* “thought the different *Offices* of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in Relation to us, and our Redemption, denoted the different *Hypostases*; but that in these several *Offices*, they still preserved the τὸ ὄν, the peculiar Properties of the Godhead, *Self-Existence* and *Eternal* [i].” So that according to this Doctrine, the Son was not *begotten*, but was

[i] *Knowles*, p. 107.



*self-existent* as well as *coeternal* with the Father. But he proceeds, and says, "For with  
 "Respect to their Divinity, or *Ufia*, it is one  
 "and the same in all; the Father is God, the  
 "Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God:  
 "But with Regard to the Difference of their  
 "Relation to us, the *Hypostasis* of the Father  
 "consists in *creating*, the *Hypostasis* of the Son  
 "in *redeeming*, and the *Hypostasis* of the Holy  
 "Ghost in *sanctifying* us [k]." Which, if I  
 understand *English*, is as rank *Sabellianism* as  
 ever was uttered. For *Sabellius* allowed the  
 Godhead of the Father, and of the Son, and of  
 the Holy Ghost, to be all one; and said, they  
 were only to be distinguished by their *Ενεργειαι*,  
*Operations* or *Offices*. And that this was also  
 the real Sentiment of Mr. *Knowles*, is manifest  
 from the following Sentence, where he says,  
 "The Plurality of the *Hypostases* therefore,  
 "must center in one Essence or *Ufia*; only that  
 "Essence is distinguishable in a personal Ca-  
 "pacity, by *relative Denominations*; which no  
 "more make them three Substances, than (ac-  
 "cording to the common Similitude among the  
 "Ancients to illustrate this Mystery) the sever-  
 "al Members of the Body, which have sepa-  
 "rate *Offices*, can be called several Bodies [l]."

[k] Id. p. 108.

[l] Id. *ibid.*



Now as the Disciples of *Sabellius* were called *Patropassians*, by way of Ridicule, because the Consequence of this Doctrine manifestly tended to prove, that the Trinity consisted but of one really existent Being, and therefore, that if the Son suffered, the Father must also have suffered along with him; so I think there cannot be a stronger Instance given of this *Patropassian* Doctrine being the Doctrine of Mr. *Knowles*, and of those Ancients from whom he borrowed this Allusion, than that which is here produced of the several Members of the Body; since, as St. *Paul* observes, *if one Member suffers, all the Members suffer along with it* [m]; whence it must follow of Consequence, according to this Doctrine, that, if the Son suffered, the Father must have suffered also. And yet I should think, since his Grace of *Canterbury* hath been pleased to honour this Treatise with the Loan of his Name, that we may safely take it for granted that this is the Doctrine of the Church of *England*.

And whereas Mr. *Knowles*, notwithstanding the Quotation produced out of Dr. *Cudworth* by the Author of the *Essay*, still insists that *Origen* was a Favourer of that Doctrine which

[m] Cor. xii. 26.

has since been propagated by *Athanasius*; to put this Matter out of any further Dispute for the future, I shall quote a Part of the Comment of *Origen* on these Words of St. *John*,  
 Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸ θεόν, καὶ  
 θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, *John* i. 1. Upon which *Origen* remarks “ that St. *John* sometimes puts the  
 “ Article before the Word *God*, and some-  
 “ times, in order to make a Distinction, omits it.  
 “ When he makes Use of the Article, then, says  
 “ he, he alludes to that unbegotten *God*, who  
 “ is the Cause of all Things; but when he  
 “ speaks of *the Word* being *God*, he omits it.  
 “ — For, says he, the *αὐτόθεος* is the *God*  
 “ with the Article, as our Saviour acknowledg-  
 “ es in his Prayer to *God the Father*, saying,  
 “ *that they may know thee the only true God* [n].  
 “ But whatever exists as *God*, besides this  
 “ *αὐτόθεος*, is made *God* by the Participation  
 “ of the Divinity, and is not to be styled *the*  
 “ *God* with the Article, but *God* without  
 “ it.”

I shall trouble you with no further Remarks on this Performance, only to observe in general, that this Author's Arguments are like false Allies in the Day of Battle, who turn their Backs on the Enemy, and only draw their

[n] *John* xvii. 3.

Swords against that Party which brought them into the Field.

I hear there are some Bishops on this Side of the Water, who have chosen the easier Part of censuring the *Essay*, rather than answering it. Upon which I shall make no further Animadversions at present, than just to let them know, that it would have been much properer for them, had they been able, to have answered it; and thereby to have endeavoured to wipe off the Aspersions too often thrown on the upper Part of the Clergy, under the well known Sarcasm of *leaving to tattered Crape the Drudgery of Prayer*. And, if they are not able, they had better not expose themselves.

And the more so, because it is made an Objection to the Author of *The Essay*, by some of those Persons who have written against him, that he acknowledges his having changed his Sentiments since his having received holy Orders. And therefore the Author of *The Genuine Sequel*, puts this Question to him, *Had you not Time to consider these Things before you took holy Orders?* Upon which I shall beg leave to remark, that this Question does no great Honour to the studious Labours of the Orthodox Clergy in general: For it shews it to be the Opinion of this Author at least, that the Clergy do not take much Pains to improve

improve their Minds after they are once put into Orders.

Gentlemen are generally ordained Priests, when they are Twenty-four or Twenty-five Years of Age. And is this an Age for any Person of a Profession to have his Mind made up, and never to attempt the improving of it afterwards? Is *Theology* a Science of such easy Acquisition, as to be thoroughly mastered at that Time of Life? And indeed I cannot help thinking, if this Objection has any Force in it, that the noble Provision which is made for the Bishops, and several of our dignified Clergymen, and which is generally supposed to have been granted for the Encouragement of Learning, is greatly misapplied, if none of them acquire additional Knowledge after once they have received holy Orders.

*I am,*

S I R, &c.

T H E E N D.

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